Fraser Shipyard & Industrial
Centre Ltd. v The "Atlantis Two", (1999) 170 F.T.R. , varied in part
(July 28, 1999) No. T-111-98 (F.C.T.D.). This was a hearing to determine
priorities to the sale proceeds of the Defendant vessel. The claimants
and their claims were: a bunker supplier for bunkers supplied pursuant
to a court order granting a priority as Marshall's expenses; the crew
for wages; the Master for disbursements; the Crown for the costs of
repatriating the crew; the charterer for bunkers supplied to the ship
and for damages for breach of charter party; suppliers of necessaries
claiming foreign maritime liens in respect of both goods supplied
to the Defendant ship and goods supplied to sister ships; the sub-charterer
for breach of charter party; the mortgagee; and a ship repairer, without
possession, for work done to the vessel to remedy deficiencies noted
in a Port State Control Detention Order.
The court allowed the claim of the bunker supplier
pursuant to the previous court order as a first claim on the proceeds
after the costs of sale. Next in priority was the claim of the crew
and officers for wages and of the Master for disbursements for food
for the crew, who had been abandoned by the owner. Next in priority
was the claim of the Crown for the costs of repatriating the crew,
which was a claim and priority that had been assigned to the Crown
by the crew pursuant to an earlier court order. The court next considered
the claim of the charterer for fuel and damages for breach of charter
party .
With respect to the claim for fuel, the charterer
claimed both for fuel consumed at Vancouver and for fuel on board
the vessel when sold. The charterer’s claim for priority in respect
of fuel consumed was disallowed by the court on the grounds that the
charterer did not obtain a court order in advance of supplying fuel
to the vessel. The court considered whether there were any special
circumstances that might justify a variation in the normal order of
priorities but held that there were no such special circumstances.
The charterer was, however, entitled to the value of bunkers not consumed
and on board the vessel when she was sold, this fuel being the charterer’s
property. With respect to the charterer's claim for breach of charter
party, the court held that the charter party made it clear that it
was subject to English law and under both English and Canadian law
there is only a statutory right in rem as a remedy for breach of a
charter party and no priority. With respect to the claims of foreign
necessaries suppliers, primarily American suppliers, the court was
invited to reconsider the fairness of allowing such suppliers a priority
when their Canadian counterparts had only a right of action in rem.
The court declined to do so but noted that it
may be time for Canadian necessaries suppliers to press for legislative
change. The court allowed the claims of all but one the American suppliers
but only in respect of goods delivered to the "Atlantis Two". One
claim allowed was in respect of goods supplied to the "Atlantis Two"
at Mexico and Vancouver by a Norwegian company through an American
agent. A claim that was disallowed at first instance was a claim in
respect of cylinder heads sold F.O.B. Houston, Texas and delivered
to Australia and Vancouver. The Prothonotary found that there was
no evidence that the goods were, in fact, delivered to the vessel
and held therefore that no maritime lien arose.
On appeal, Rouleau J. found that the shipping
invoices clearly indicated that the cylinder heads were to be shipped
to a specifically identified vessel (the "Atlantis Two") in Australia
and Vancouver. This, he held, was sufficient to establish delivery
to the vessel and to find a maritime lien. It is noteworthy that,
insofar as the claims by American suppliers were for the supply of
goods or services to sister ships of the "Atlantis Two", the court
held that such claims did not attract a maritime lien and were mere
rights of action in rem with no priority. With respect to the claim
of the sub-charterer for breach of charter party, the court held that
this claim was governed by American law by virtue of an arbitration
clause in the charter party calling for New York arbitration. The
court considered the expert evidence that had been filed and concluded
that pursuant to American law the sub-charterer had a maritime lien.
Accordingly, the court found that the claim of the sub-charterer ranked
ahead of the mortgagee. In doing so, the court acknowledged that this
was a higher ranking than the sub-charterer would enjoy under American
law.
This result flows from the fact that the substantive
nature of the lien is determined by American law yet the ranking of
priorities is determined by Canadian law. The court then turned to
the claims of the mortgagee and the shipyard. The shipyard argued
that it was entitled to priority over the mortgagee on two grounds:
first, it argued that the mortgagee should lose its priority because
it had been dilatory in enforcing the mortgage; second, it argued
that the court in the exercise of its equitable discretion should
grant it an enhanced priority because of the mortgagee’s delay
in enforcing the mortgage and because the repairs done to the vessel
(most, if not all repairs were done prior to the arrest) had added
to the value of the vessel to the benefit of all creditors.
With respect to the first argument the court
accepted that a dilatory mortgagee might lose its priority if there
was strong evidence the mortgagee knew money was being spent on the
ship by the repairer and knew that the ship owner was insolvent. However,
the court found as a fact that the mortgagee was not aware of the
insolvency of the owner and was not fully apprised of the extent and
value of the repairs being undertaken by the repairer. Accordingly,
the court held that the mortgagee did not lose its priority. The court
next considered whether it ought to exercise its equitable discretion
to grant the shipyard an enhanced priority.
The shipyard relied on various factors justifying
an enhanced priority including that the repairs were done to correct
deficiencies that had resulted in a detention order against the vessel
being issued by Port State Control and that as a result of the work
done by it the detention order was lifted and the value of the vessel
was significantly enhanced.
The shipyard argued that all of this increase in value would go to
the mortgagee who had been dilatory in enforcing its mortgage if the
usual ranking was not altered. The court ultimately agreed with the
shipyard that there would be an unjust enrichment if the usual order
of priorities was not altered. The court, therefore, granted the shipyard
a priority equivalent to that of the American maritime lien claimants
to the extent of US$220,000.00, being the increase in the value of
the vessel consequent upon the repair work. |